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1 Introduction
Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at desirable
levels will require large reductions in carbon emissions from energy production
in the coming decades. Such large reductions will not be achievable without
developing carbon-free energy technologies. In order to achieve their emission
targets, open economies will likely rely on the global technology frontier just as
much as on their own research eﬀort. The dependency on the global technol-
ogy level is frequently used as a rationale for focusing on technology adoption
rather than funding domestic R&D on new technologies. On the other hand,
a stringent climate policy or support to environmental R&D could stimulate
the emergence of new, profitable export niches. The Danish windmill indus-
try is often put forward as an example of the latter, and in Norway similar
arguments are used in connection with carbon capture technology from gas
power plants.
In this paper we explicitly include the export potential of new technologies
in our evaluation of climate policies. In particular, we consider the claim that
governments acting strategically should set a more strict climate policy than
other countries in order to spur a pollution abatement export sector within
their country. In most signatory countries to the Kyoto treaty the govern-
ments currently control the buying and selling of carbon emission allowances
on the international market. The governments are therefore in principle able
to enforce a higher domestic shadow price on carbon emissions than the in-
ternational quota price. Further, we also evaluate an R&D subsidy to new
abatement technologies as part of the optimal policy mix.
Based on theoretical as well as numerical analyses, we conclude that en-
forcing a more stringent climate policy than other countries may in fact be
well founded. It will increase the competition between the technology suppli-
ers, and lead to lower domestic abatement costs. However, to our surprise, a
strict environmental policy is not a particularly good industrial policy with
respect to developing new successful export sectors. Since carbon abatement
technology is a traded good, the foreign pollution abatement industry also
responds to a stricter national environmental policy. Hence, the national pol-
lution abatement industry will not gain any competitive advantage on the
foreign pollution abatement industry.
Matters are diﬀerent with respect to supporting environmental R&D. As
opposed to a stringent climate policy, an R&D subsidy unambiguously spurs
the export performance of the domestic technology firm on behalf of the for-
eign firms, although our numerical simulations indicate that this eﬀect is
small. As interestingly, in the numerical simulations we also find that a sub-
sidy program is complimentary to a stringent climate policy. Hence, with
respect to abatement technologies, technology push programs should not be
launched as an alternative to market pull strategies, but rather as a compli-
ment.
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There already exists a well developed strand of theoretical literature an-
alyzing strategic use of environmental policy, see for example Barrett[3] and
Rauscher [17]. Parts of this literature also include strategic environmental
R&D conducted by the polluting firms themselves as a response to environ-
mental policy, see Ulph[21] and Ulph[22]. The main findings in this literature
are that the incentive to use environmental policy strategically depends on
the form of downstream competition and the availability of other governmen-
tal policy instruments. For instance, in Barrett[3] it is shown that an export
subsidy completely removes the incentive to use environmental policy strate-
gically. Further, while Cournot competition downstream generally calls for
a weak environmental policy, Bertrand competition downstream calls for the
opposite, namely an especially stringent environmental policy. The inclusion
of R&D conducted by the polluting firms does not radically change this pic-
ture. According to Ulph[21] and Ulph[22], it introduces a new incentive for
acting strategically, that is, the government may try to influence the foreign
level of environmental R&D. However, the direction of this eﬀect is ambigu-
ous, and it may reinforce the incentive to set a weak policy under Cournot
competition, and vice-versa under Bertrand competition.
The literature on strategic use of environmental policy has until now fo-
cused entirely on the competitiveness of the downstream polluting industries
themselves, but in this paper we shift focus to an upstream abatement technol-
ogy industry, serving both domestic and foreign polluting firms. The analysis
reveals a new strategic eﬀect which we coin the price eﬀect .In order to obtain
lower prices on abatement equipment, the government commits to an espe-
cially stringent environmental standard inducing a higher elasticity of demand
for abatement technology. This lowers the price through a lower markup on
costs for the suppliers of the technology.
That environmental policy may have a price eﬀect is backed by the ex-
perience with the U.S. SO2 cap and trade program. According to Burtraw
and Palmer [4], the main savings from the program were due to increased
competition between abatement suppliers, and not from diﬀering abatement
costs among polluters. When regulation changed from a technology standard
to tradable emission quotas, upstream industries such as railroad transporta-
tion, scrubber manufacturing and coal mining companies were thrown into
competition with each other in a race to supply the electricity generating
industry with low cost compliance strategies. This leads the price of low sul-
phur coal to fall by 9% even though total supply increased by 28%. Further,
coal transportation prices fell from 20-26 mills (one mill is the thousandth
of a dollar) per ton-mile to 10-14 mills per ton-mile. Lastly, the eﬃciency of
scrubbers was enhanced, leading to a drop in the price of scrubbing measured
as emission reduction per $.
Moreover, the inclusion of an environmental R&D subsidy does not remove
the price eﬀect and the incentive to use environmental policy strategically as
is the case for an export/production subsidy in the strategic environmental
policy literature. Rather, they seem to reinforce each other, that is, a strin-
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gent environmental policy makes the market for abatement technology larger,
which again increases the benefits from an environmental R&D subsidy.
The Danish windmill industry is often put forward as an example of a
successful combination of environmental and industrial policy. In order to
reduce the carbon content of their energy supply, the Danes have heavily sup-
ported their domestic windmill industry through both proportional standards
for clean energy production, and various kinds of subsidies. The Danish wind-
mill industry has become one of the dominant actors in the world market for
windmills. However, the viability of the diﬀerent policy measures in welfare
terms has been questioned by economists. Jespersen[9] concludes that nei-
ther the investment nor the production subsidy has been welfare enhancing
in terms of induced domestic cost savings. Further, based on a CGE model
for Denmark, Rasmussen[16] shows that further Danish subsidies to the pro-
duction of wind power are likely to have limited cost saving eﬀects, and thus
also, a questionable welfare eﬀect. On the other hand, neither Jespersen[9]
nor Rasmussen[16] take into account the potential for strategic trade policy.
With respect to climate policy and carbon abatement, a particularly in-
teresting new abatement technology is carbon capture and storage (CCS).
According to a recent OECD study [15], a major share of future electric-
ity production will be from coal and gas power plants with CCS. Sensitivity
analyses carried out in the same study taking into account for instance in-
creased competitiveness of renewables, suggests that, overall, CCS is a robust
option from a cost eﬀectiveness perspective. In the paper we supplement our
theoretical analysis with numerical simulations based on hypothetical future
markets for carbon capture technologies.1 The eﬀects of activist trade poli-
cies have often been shown to be welfare reducing instead of improving, or
have been shown to have a very modest eﬀect, see for example Venables [23].
When our results are more encouraging with respect to an activist policy, i.e.,
subsidies to environmental R&D in combination with an especially stringent
climate policy, it is mainly due to the eﬀect on domestic carbon abatement
costs, and to a lesser degree improved export performance.
With respect to the other literature on research and development of new
pollution abatement techniques, it has mainly focused on instrument choice
such as the choice between tradeable emission quotas and emission taxes,
see for instance Downing and White[6], Jung et al.[10] and Requate and
Unold[18]. In these contributions environmental R&D either happens within
the polluting firm, or the polluting firm can buy the right to use the innovation
to a fixed price. However, imperfect competition is likely to be central to any
innovation process. Firms will only be willing to take the risk of spending re-
search and development costs, if they can for some time enjoy oligopoly rents,
see for instance Romer[19] for his seminal work on competition in an R&D
sector. As far as we know, this is the first contribution that explicitly takes
imperfect competition in the R&D sector into account while analyzing climate
1 In contrast, most former numerical studies of strategic trade policy is conducted on
historical, real market data, see for example Baldwin and Krugman[2].
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policy and its eﬀect on the development of new abatement technologies.
2 The model
The model used in the paper is a three stage game between a government
in a small country and a limited number of upstream firms supplying abate-
ment technology. The government moves first, and may use its climate policy
strategically to influence the behavior of the upstream firms.
Our point of departure is the reciprocal-dumping model, see Brander and
Krugman[5]. There are two separate output markets; one in a small country
A and one in a large region B. In the first stage of the game the government
in A sets a national carbon emission target for its polluting output industry,
taking as given the carbon emission target of B and the international quota
price on carbon emissions. Then, in the second stage the firms oﬀering abate-
ment technology decide on the amount of R&D2, which will reduce the cost
of supplying the technology to the output industry in a deterministic manner.
Finally, in the third stage the technology firms compete to supply abatement
technology to the output industry both in the small country and in the large
region. In the first part of our analyses (Section 2 and 3), however, we dis-
regard stage 2, and look at policy implications when costs of producing the
technology are given.
We assume that environmental policy become simultaneously known in
both regions at some point of time τ0, and that it comes into play at a future
point of time τ0+∆τ . The R&D is conducted in the intermediate period ∆τ .
In the rest of the analyses we will speak of the output market as the elec-
tricity market, and the abatement technology as carbon capture and storage
(CCS).3 However, the results may of course be generalized to other markets
and abatement technologies, as long as the assumptions make sense (e.g.,
separate output markets).
2.1 Carbon emissions
Let emission ei of CO2 from the electricity industry in the period following
τ0 +∆τ be given:
ei = ei(qi, xi), i = a, b, (1)
where qi is electricity production of a representative firm in region i and xi
denotes the carbon capture eﬀort of the representative firm in region i. We
assume that the emission function is homogeneous of degree 1 in qi and xi,
2By R&D we also mean demonstration projects, where the main objective is to obtain
experience and reduce costs, and not to produce technology services (this is sometimes
referred to as RD&D - Research, Development and Demonstration - in the literature).
3We assume that coal-fired plants (in particular Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle
- IGCC) and gas-fired plants (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine electricity generation - CCGT)
with CCS are the only technologically feasible carbon free energy technologies for large scale
power installations. This implies that we do not model the competition between CCS and
other carbon free energy technologies such as renewables or nuclear.
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and that the derivatives have the following characteristics: ∂ei∂qi > 0,
∂2ei
(∂qi)2
≥ 0,
∂ei
∂xi
≤ 0, ∂2ei
(∂xi)2
> 0. These assumptions imply e.g. that for a given carbon
capture eﬀort, emissions per unit of output are increasing in output, and that
emission per unit of output is homogeneous of degree zero in output and
capture eﬀort.
We assume that the governments in each jurisdiction formulate their ju-
risdiction specific target for carbon emissions from the electricity industry as
a proportional standard. We do not go into detail on how the targets are
reached, i.e., by direct regulation of power utilities, by quota markets with
free allowances based on benchmarking (cf. the rules for new entrants in the
EU Emission Trading Scheme), or by green certificate markets including CCS
as a ”green” technology. Instead we concentrate on the upstream eﬀects of
environmental policy.
Denote the level of standard in region i by ri such that ri = 1− eiqi , i.e., a
higher ri implies a smaller proportional standard. The necessary amount of
carbon capture eﬀort to reach the jurisdiction specific target is then given:
xi = xˆi(ri, qi) (2)
where the derivatives fulfil ∂xˆi∂ri ≥ 0,
∂xˆi
∂qi
> 0.4 Since the emission function is
homogeneous of degree 1, we can reformulate (2) to:
xi = xˆi(ri, qi) = xi(ri)qi, (3)
where ∂xi∂ri ≥ 0,
∂2xi
(∂ri)2
≥ 0.
Denote carbon storage eﬀorts by yi. Clearly, carbon capture and car-
bon storage are compliments, which implies yi = xi. The total cost of the
representative electricity firm can then be expressed:
ctoti (qi) = c0qi + (wi + vi)xi(ri)qi, (4)
where c0 is the marginal cost ex carbon abatement of power production, and
where wi is the jurisdiction specific price of CO2 capture, vi is the jurisdiction
specific price of CO2 storage. Note that the constant marginal cost of the
representative electricity producer implies zero profit.
Let pa denote the electricity price in Country A and pb the electricity
price in Region B. Demand for electricity in each jurisdiction is given by the
following demand functions:
qi = qi(pi), (5)
where qi < 0.
The constant marginal cost of the representative electricity producer im-
plies that the power price is given from supply, while power production is given
4We have (1− ri) = ei(qi,xi)qi , which can be inverted to yield xi = xi(ri, qi). The signs on
the first order derivatives follow from total diﬀerentiation of the equation (1−ri) = ei(qi,xi)qi .
We must have ∂ei∂qi > (1− ri) in order to have
∂xi
∂qi
> 0.
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from demand. With respect to consumer surplus, we have CSi = CSi(qi) with
CSi ≥ 0, i.e., that consumer surplus increases in output.
2.2 The demand for carbon capture
We will now derive the demand function for carbon capture in each region.
First, we need to solve for the optimal quantity of electricity production.
In equilibrium the electricity price must be equal to the marginal cost of
electricity: pi = c0 + (wi + vi)xi(ri). From the demand function (5) we then
have:
qi = qi(c0 + (wi + vi)xi(ri)), (6)
which gives the size of power production in each jurisdiction.
From (3) we have that total demand for carbon capture x is:
xi = xi(ri)qi = xi(ri)qi(c0 + (wi + vi)xi(ri)), (7)
The function (7) is the demand function for carbon capture in each ju-
risdiction. While we assume that the price of carbon storage is given, and
dependent on local conditions in each region, the price of carbon capture is
endogenous and dependent on demand and supply. Of great interest is then
how the elasticity of demand depends on the climate policy:
Lemma 1 For all concave or iso-elastic demand functions, the price elastic-
ity of demand for carbon capture is increasing in the emission standard, that
is,
∂Elxi,wi∂ri
 > 0.
Proof. The elasticity of demand is given:
Elxi,wi =
xi(ri)wi
∂qi
∂pi
qi(ci + (wi + vi)xi(ri))
and its derivative with respect to the level of regulation:
∂Elxi,wi
∂ri
= wi
∂xi
∂ri
qi
∂qi
∂pi
− (wi + vi)xi(ri)

∂qi
∂pi
2
− qi ∂
2qi
∂p2i

[qi(ci + (wi + vi)xi(ri))]
2
which is negative as long as ∂
2qi
∂p2i
≤ 0. Observe that (wi + vi)xi(ri) < pi
since ci > 0. Hence, if
∂2qi
∂p2i
> 0, a suﬃcient, but not necessary condition
is:
qi ∂qi∂pi
 ≥ −pi

∂qi
∂pi
2
− qi ∂
2qi
∂p2i

, which always holds with ” = ”for the
demand function qi = αp
−β
i .
When meeting the emission target, the representative firm chooses be-
tween reducing output and investing in pollution abatement equipment. For
instance, if the firm has m plants and none with carbon capture, it will have
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to buy some carbon capture technology in order to comply with a propor-
tional standard. However, if one or more plants already have installed carbon
capture technology, the firm can also respond by reducing output from the
plants that haven’t installed such technology. Consequently, as climate policy
gets increasingly stringent, the representative firm will on the margin be more
prone to reduce output, and more reluctant to invest in carbon capture equip-
ment. This eﬀect explains why the price elasticity increases. In the rest of
the paper we restrict attention to demand functions qi(pi) for which Lemma
1 applies.
2.3 The supply of carbon capture
We are then able to look at the supply of carbon capture. We assume that
there is one firm in Country A and one firm in Region B that supply carbon
capture equipment.5 Both firms supply their home market as well as the
foreign market. Thus, total supply of carbon capture equipment in country A
xa is xha + x
f
b , while total supply of carbon capture in region B xb is x
f
a + xhb .
Note that xhi denotes the supply of a carbon capture firm in jurisdiction i to
its home market, and that xfi denotes the supply of a firm in jurisdiction i to
its export market (i.e., jurisdiction −i).6
Supply of carbon capture takes place to a constant marginal cost ρi, which
in turn may be dependent of the amount of research zi done by firm i in a
former period. We will return to the R&D game in Section 4. Further, we
assume that there is a trade cost t associated with supplying the foreign
market.7
The demand for carbon capture is described by (7), which can be inverted
to yield: wi(xi, ri) = 1xi(ri)pi

xi
xi(ri)

− c0xi(ri) − vi.where pi(·) is the inverse of
qi(·). In the market game the carbon capture firm in jurisdiction i maximizes:
maxπi =
k
wi

xhi + x
f
−i, ri

− ρi
l
xhi +
k
w−i

xh−i + x
f
i , r−i

− ρi − t
l
xfi ,
(8)
We look for a Cournot-Nash solution in each market. The first-order con-
ditions from the profit expressions yield two independent sets of two equations
for the four unknown outputs of carbon capture technology:
5 In the simulations presented later, we expand the model with more firms in Region B.
6 If i = a, then −i = b and vice-versa.
7One reason for the trade cost could be diﬀerences in technology between the two up-
stream firms, e.g., that the large region firm mainly focuses on coal-fired power plants while
the small country firm mainly focuses on gas-fired power plants. According to OECD[15]
both type of plants will be equipped with carbon capture in future climate policy scenarios,
however, the respective capture technologies are more or less diﬀerent.
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∂πa
∂xha
=
∂wa

xha+x
f
b ,ra

∂xha
xha +wa − ρa = 0 &
∂πb
∂xfb
=
∂wa

xha+x
f
b ,ra

∂xfb
xfb +wa − ρb − t = 0
(9)
∂πa
∂xfa
=
∂wb

xfa+x
h
b ,rb

∂xfa
xfa +wb − ρa − t = 0 &
∂πb
∂xhb
=
∂wa

xfa+x
h
b ,rb

∂xhb
xhb +wb − ρb = 0
(10)
Thus, we can write the Cournot-Nash solutions to the two market games
as follows:
xhi = x
h
i (ρa, ρb, ri) , x
f
i = x
f
i (ρa, ρb, r−i) , (11)
Note that the levels of regulation ri and r−i do not appear together. With
respect to export output, we therefore get the following remark:
Remark 2 For a given cost of carbon capture ρi, a higher environmental
standard ri will have no eﬀect on the export output of carbon capture equip-
ment from region i, i.e. ∂x
f
i
∂ri
= 0.
However, for the policy maker, it is also of great interest how the price of
carbon capture is aﬀected by the level of regulation. The price on carbon cap-
ture wi is given from wi = wi(xhi (ρa, ρb, ri)+x
f
i (ρa, ρb, ri) , ri). Consequently,
the price on carbon capture is influenced by the level of regulation in juris-
diction i through two channels; directly by aﬀecting the demand function for
carbon capture technology, and indirectly by aﬀecting the Nash-equilibrium
outputs. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For given marginal costs of carbon capture ρi, ρ−i, the price
of carbon capture equipment wi is decreasing in the emission standard ri, i.e.
dwi
dri
< 0.
Proof. The equations in (9) and (10) can be rewritten according to:
wi − ρi
wi
=
xhi /(x
h
i + x
f
−i)
|Elxi,wi |
&
wi − ρ−i − t
wi
=
xf−i/(x
h
i + x
f
−i)
|Elxi,wi |
.
By Lemma 1 we know that the elasticity of demand is increasing in the
emission standard ri. Hence, at least one of the right hand sides of the
expressions above will decrease, and consequently the left hand side in that
expression has to decrease. Since
d(w−ρ
w
)
dw > 0, the price has to decrease.
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Proposition 3 is an application of a well known result from general Cournot
analysis i.e. that the firms’ margin over costs decreases if the elasticity of
demand increases, see for example Vives[24], page 100.
It will also be of interest how xhi and x
f
−i respond to a strengthening of
climate policy ri. It turns out that it is hard to get unambiguous results for
∂xhi
∂ri
and
∂xf−i
∂ri
. It seems reasonable to assume ∂x
h
i
∂ri
> 0 i.e. a stricter climate
target in jurisdiction i will increase the output of carbon capture equipment
from the upstream firm in jurisdiction i. This assumption is confirmed in our
numerical simulations8. It then follows that
∂xf−i
∂ri
> 0 as long as xhi ≈ x
f
−i and
∂xf−i
∂ri
< 0 if xhi >> x
f
−i(see Appendix A).
3 Optimal environmental policy in Country A without R&D
We assume that each region has entered into an international agreement,
which has put a ceiling on total emissions of carbon. Further, we assume that
Country A is free to trade in carbon emissions to a fixed quota price of .
In particular, we assume that the government controls the total amount of
emission trading across the border such that marginal abatement cost may
diﬀer across jurisdictions.
For Country A welfare is then given:
Wa = CSa(qa)− ε(1− ra)qa +
k
wa

xha(ra) + x
f
b (ra), ra

− ρa
l
xha(ra) (12)
+
k
wb

xhb (rb) + x
f
a(rb), rb

− ρa − t
l
xfa(rb),
where the first term is consumer surplus expressed as a function of total elec-
tricity output, the second term is residual emissions times the quota price,
the third term is the profit of the domestic carbon capture firm obtained in
the domestic market and finally, the fourth term is the profit of the domestic
carbon capture firm obtained in the foreign market. Note that we have sup-
pressed ρa and ρb from x
h
i and x
f
i since these are given. Finally, we assume
that carbon storage can be carried out to a fixed price, and that there is zero
profit in this activity.
The first-order condition is:
∂Wa
∂ra
= CS
∂qa
∂ra
− ε

(1− ra)
∂qa
∂ra
+ qa

+

CS − ε(1− ra)
 ∂qa
∂wa
dwa
dra
(13)
+

∂wa
∂xha
xha(ra) +wa − ρa

∂xha
∂ra
+
%
∂wa
∂ra
+
∂wa
∂xfb
∂xfb
∂ra
&
xha(ra) = 0.
8Two suﬃcient, but not necessary, conditions for the assumption to hold in the general
case are given in Appendix A.
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We assume that ∂
2Wa
∂(ra)2
< 0, and hence, that a maximum exists. The first
term in (13) is the loss in consumer surplus due to a more stringent climate
policy, while the second term is the savings in emission quota expenditures due
to a more stringent policy. The third term is the net benefit from a lower price
on carbon capture technology. The next term
k
∂wa
∂xha
xha(ra) +wa − ρa
l
∂xha
∂ra
is
the eﬀect on the carbon capture firm’s profit from changes in its own output
of carbon capture technology. Since the firm has set its output optimally, the
eﬀect is zero, see the first order condition (9). The last term is the eﬀect on the
carbon capture firm’s profit from changes in the demand function for carbon
capture technology and from changes in the foreign output of carbon capture
technology. In other words, there are two strategic eﬀects; a price eﬀect
[CS − ε(1− ra)] ∂qa∂wa
dwa
dra
and a rent eﬀect

∂wa
∂ra
+ ∂wa
∂xfb
∂xfb
∂ra

xha(ra) confined to
the domestic market.
Our benchmark is the textbook rule for optimal environmental policy,
i.e., marginal abatement cost should equal the quota price. If the welfare
maximizing environmental policy diverts from the textbook rule, we will say
that environmental policy is weak/stringent depending on whether marginal
abatement cost is lower/higher than the quota price. Setting the two strategic
eﬀects equal to zero, we obtain for the textbook rule:
ε =
−CS ∂qa∂rak
qa − (1− ra)∂qa∂ra
l . (14)
The term in the numerator is the change in consumer surplus (keeping
the price wa constant), while the term in the denominator is the change
in emissions (again keeping the price wa constant). Since there is constant
returns to scale in electricity production, there is no loss in producer surplus
from this sector. We will refer to the emission standard that fulfills (14) by
r0a.
From (13), as long as the two strategic eﬀects equal zero, we must have
CS − ε(1− r0a)

> 0 (since∂qa∂ra < 0). Further, this inequality must also hold
when marginal abatement cost exceeds the quota price, due to the concavity
ofWa(ra). Thus, the price eﬀect is positive when policy is set at the textbook
rule or stronger (both ∂qa∂wa and
dwa
dra
are negative).
The first part of the rent eﬀect is negative since for a given output on
carbon capture technology, the price on carbon capture technology falls. The
second part depends on the term ∂x
f
b
∂ra
, that is, in what direction the foreign
carbon capture firm will change its output as a response to a more stringent
climate policy. When trade costs are small, it seems reasonable to assume that
it is positive, and hence the rent eﬀect will be negative. We then have that a
stringent climate policy both lowers the domestic price on carbon capture and
induces the foreign firm to increase its output in the domestic market, which
both on the margin hurts the domestic firm. Our findings are summarized in
the following proposition:
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Proposition 4 A small, open economy may have incentives to set an espe-
cially stringent environmental policy. However, only one of the two mentioned
strategic eﬀects pulls unambiguously in this direction:
1. A strict emission standard will make carbon abatement cheaper. This
is the price eﬀect, which pulls unambiguously in the direction of a more
stringent policy.
2. A strict emission standard may reduce the abatement industry’s ability
to extract rents in its domestic market. This is the rent eﬀect, which
may pull in the direction of a weaker policy.
Note that the export market plays no role in the setting of the optimal
climate policy. This, however, change when we include environmental R&D.
4 Including environmental R&D
We now include R&D in the model by assuming that the marginal costs of
carbon capture are determined by the amount of R&D done by the carbon
capture firms. Let ρi = ρ(zi) in which zi is the total level of carbon capture
R&D expenditures in jurisdiction i. For the derivatives of ρ we have; ρ <
0 and ρ ≥ 0. Further, let (1 − ζi)zi denote the private cost of R&D in
jurisdiction i where ζi is the region specific subsidy rate. Clearly, results
from R&D done by one firm could sometimes be utilized by the other carbon
capture firm, and hence, influence the marginal cost of carbon capture in that
region. This is often coined a spill-over, or a positive R&D externality, and
we return to this issue in a companion paper [8].
We apply the closed loop solution concept, see Tirole, chapter 8[?]. In the
stage before the market game, the two carbon capture firms maximize their
profit with respect to zi taking into account how the level of R&D aﬀects
their profit in the market game:
max
zi
ωi =
k
wi

xhi + x
f
−i, ri

− ρi(zi)
l
xhi
+
k
w−i

xh−i + x
f
i , r−i

− ρi(zi)− t
l
xfi − (1− ζi)zi,
where ωi denotes the profits of the two carbon capture firms after R&D expen-
ditures, and where xhi = x
h
i (ρa(za), ρb(zb), ri) and x
f
i = x
f
i (ρa(za), ρb(zb), r−i).
From general Cournot theory we have ∂x
h
i
∂ρi
≤ 0, ∂x
f
−i
∂ρi
≤ 0 and ∂x
h
i
∂ρ−i
≥ 0, ∂x
f
i
∂ρ−i
≥
0.
The two first-order conditions are:
∂ωi
∂zi
=
%
∂wi
∂xf−i
∂xf−i
∂ρi
xhi +
∂w−i
∂xh−i
∂xh−i
∂ρi
xfi
&
∂ρi
∂zi
−
k
xhi + x
f
i
l ∂ρi
∂zi
− (1− ζi) = 0,
(15)
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where the terms

∂wi
∂xhi
xhi +wi − ρi(zi)

∂xhi
∂ρi
∂ρi
∂zi
+

∂w−i
∂xfi
xfi +w−i − ρi(zi)− t

∂xfi
∂ρi
∂ρi
∂zi
have been eliminated since by (9) and (10) they are both equal to zero.
The first term in (15) is the strategic eﬀect of R&D expenditures. Since
∂ρi
∂zi
< 0 ,
∂xf−i
∂ρi
,
∂xh−i
∂ρi
> 0 and ∂wi
∂xf−i
, ∂w−i
∂xh−i
< 0, the strategic eﬀect is positive.
Thus, both firms act strategically, and tends to over-invest in R&D in order
to gain marketshare in the subsequent market game. The two other terms
are the marginal savings from R&D in the costs of producing carbon capture
technology with a given carbon abatement eﬀect and the marginal cost of
R&D itself.
The two first-order conditions determine the Nash-equilibrium levels of
R&D in the second stage of the game. Assuming that the second-order con-
ditions for profit maximum hold, and that the uniqueness condition for the
Nash equilibrium is met, R&D levels can be written as; zi = zi(ri, r−i, ζi, ζ−i)
for i = a, b. In order to find the signs on the derivatives of the function
zi = zi(ri, r−i, ζi, ζ−i), we diﬀerentiate the system (15) (see Appendix B).
This results in the following table of eﬀects:
Table I. Comparative statics of the R&D Nash-equilibrium
dzi
dri
W 0; dzidr−iU 0; dzidζi> 0; dzidζ−i< 0;
When za = zb, we have
dzi
dri
> 0. In Appendix B we further argue that
it is reasonable to assume dzidri > 0 for za 9= zb. The derivative
dzi
dr−i
cannot
be signed even in the special case when za = zb. However, for a low trade
cost t (compared to the price) we likely have dzidr−i > 0, see Appendix B. This
conjecture is confirmed in the numerical simulations.
Note that the eﬀects of an R&D subsidy are unambiguous, even in the
general case. An R&D subsidy gives more environmental R&D at home, and
less environmental R&D abroad. We also have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The price on carbon capture equipment wi is decreasing in
the R&D subsidy ζi i.e.
∂wi
∂ζi
< 0 and in the environmental policy instrument
ri i.e. ∂wi∂ri < 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Hence, Proposition 3 continues to hold for the case with environmental
R&D. A more stringent environmental standard now has two desirable eﬀects;
I) It increases the elasticity of demand, lowering the markup over costs in the
Nash-equilibrium and II) It increases the R&D eﬀort of both firms, leading
to lower production costs for carbon capture equipment.
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An R&D subsidy leads to more environmental R&D in the domestic firm
and less environmental R&D in the foreign firm. The former eﬀect is stronger
than the latter eﬀect, and hence the price on carbon capture falls due to lower
costs for the domestic firm.
4.1 The eﬀect of environmental policy on export output
Before we proceed, we take a look at how environmental policy and the R&D
subsidy influences export output. Export output is given:
xfi = x
f
i (ρi(zi(ri, r−i, ζi, ζ−i)), ρ−i(z−i(ri, r−i, ζi, ζ−i)), r−i).
The derivative of this function with respect to the environmental standard
at home is given:
∂xfi
∂ri
=
∂xfi
∂ρi
ρi(zi)
dzi
dri
+
∂xfi
∂ρ−i
ρ−i(z−i)
dz−i
dri
. (16)
Since we assume dzadra > 0, the first term in (16) is unambiguously positive,
while the second term depends on the sign of dz−idri . If
dz−i
dri
is positive, which
is probable with low trade barriers, the second term is negative. Hence, the
total eﬀect on export output is ambiguous. The intuition is that a higher
environmental standard at home also makes environmental R&D more prof-
itable for the foreign carbon capture firm. Hence, the home firm will meet
tougher competition on its export market.
Then, with respect to the R&D subsidy at home:
∂xfi
∂ζi
=
∂xfi
∂ρi
ρi(zi)
dzi
dζi
+
∂xfi
∂ρ−i
ρ−i(z−i)
dz−i
dζi
. (17)
For this derivative, both terms are unambiguously positive. An R&D
subsidy makes the home firm do more environmental R&D. Since R&D lev-
els are strategic substitutes, the foreign firm does less environmental R&D.
Consequently, the home firm increases its export market share.
The following proposition sums up the results:
Proposition 6 A higher environmental standard ri will have an ambiguous
eﬀect on the export output of carbon capture equipment from region i i.e.
∂xfi
∂ri
T 0, while an environmental R&D subsidy ζi will have an unambiguous
positive eﬀect on the export output of carbon capture equipment from region i
i.e. ∂x
f
i
∂ζi
> 0.
Hence, an especially stringent environmental standard is likely not a par-
ticularly good industrial policy as long as the only purpose is to develop new
successful export sectors.
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5 Optimal environmental policy in Country A with R&D
When we include environmental R&D, the welfare for Country A is given (cf.
12):
Wa = CSa(qa)− ε(1− ra)qa +
k
wa

xha + x
f
b , ra

− ρa(za)
l
xha (18)
+
k
wb

xhb + x
f
a, rb

− ρa(za)− t
l
xfa − (1− ζa)za − ζaza.
With respect to (18), the terms have the same interpretation as in (12)
apart from the two last terms, which denotes the firm’s R&D cost and the
government’s R&D subsidy costs, respectively.9
We assume that ∂
2Wa
∂(ra)2
, ∂
2Wa
∂(ζa)
2 < 0, and hence, that a maximum exists.
First, we look at the optimal environmental standard, given the R&D subsidy.
The first-order condition is now given (cf. 13):
∂Wa
∂ra
= CS
∂qa
∂ra
+ ε

qa − (1− ra)
∂qa
∂ra

(19)
+

CS − ε(1− ra)
 ∂qa
∂wa
∂wa
∂ra
+
#
∂wa
∂ra
+
∂wa
∂xfb
∂xfb
∂ra
$
xha
+

∂wa
∂xha
xha +wa − ρa

∂xha
∂ρa
∂ρa
∂za
∂za
∂ra
+

∂wb
∂xfa
xfa +wa − ρa − t

∂xfa
∂ρa
∂ρa
∂za
∂za
∂ra
+

∂wa
∂xha
xha +wa − ρa

∂xha
∂ρb
∂ρb
∂zb
∂zb
∂ra
+

∂wb
∂xfa
xfa +wa − ρa − t

∂xfa
∂ρb
∂ρb
∂zb
∂zb
∂ra
+
+%
∂wa
∂xfb
∂xfb
∂ρa
xha +
∂wb
∂xhb
∂xhb
∂ρa
xfa
&
∂ρa
∂za
−
k
xha + x
f
a
l ∂ρa
∂za
− (1− ζa)
,
∂za
∂ra
+
%
∂wa
∂xha
∂xfb
∂ρb
xha +
∂wb
∂xhb
∂xhb
∂ρb
xfa
&
∂ρb
∂zb
∂zb
∂ra
− ζa
∂za
∂ra
= 0,
where we have eliminated (∂wa
∂xha
xha + wa − ρa)
∂xha
∂ra
since this term is equal to
zero (see the discussion of 13 above). Firstly, observe that the fifth, sixth,
seventh and eighth term in (19) are all zero by (9) and (10). Then, note that
ninth term in (19) is zero by (15). Hence, (19) can be written:
9Note that we have: xha = x
h
a(ρa(za), ρb(zb), ra), x
f
b = x
f
b (ρa(za), ρb(zb), ra), x
h
b =
xhb (ρa(za), ρb(zb), rb) and x
f
a = x
f
a(ρa(za), ρb(zb), rb).
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CS
∂qa
∂ra
+ ε

qa − (1− ra)
∂qa
∂ra

+

CS − ε(1− ra)
 ∂qa
∂wa
∂wa
∂ra
+ (20)
#
∂wa
∂ra
+
∂wa
∂xfb
∂xfb
∂ra
$
xha +
%
∂wa
∂xha
∂xfb
∂ρb
xha +
∂wb
∂xhb
∂xhb
∂ρb
xfa
&
∂ρb
∂zb
∂zb
∂ra
− ζa
∂za
∂ra
= 0
The first four terms on the left hand side of (20) are the same as in (13),
and were discussed above. Then, there is one new strategic eﬀect; a rival
R&D eﬀect,

∂wa
∂xha
∂xfb
∂ρb
xha +
∂wb
∂xhb
∂xhb
∂ρb
xfa

∂ρb
∂zb
∂zb
∂ra
. Finally, the last term is just
the fiscal cost of the R&D subsidy.
The rival R&D eﬀect tells us in what direction environmental policy shifts
oligopoly profit between the two abatement firms in both markets. If ∂zb∂ra > 0,
that is, a stricter climate target in Jurisdiction A induces the upstream firm in
Jurisdiction B to do more environmental R&D, profit is actually shifted away
from the domestic firm towards the foreign firm by a stricter standard. This
happens since the stricter standard will make it possible for the foreign firm to
commit to a higher level of environmental R&D (note that the term in brackets
is always positive). As discussed above ∂zb∂ra > 0 is likely if the trade barrier
is low compared to the constant marginal cost of producing carbon capture
equipment . With environmental R&D we thus have to extend Proposition 4
the following proposition:
Proposition 7 A small, open economy may have incentives to set an espe-
cially stringent environmental policy. However, only one of the three men-
tioned eﬀects pulls unambiguously in this direction:
1. A strict emission standard will make carbon abatement cheaper. This
is the price eﬀect, which pulls unambiguously in the direction of a more
stringent policy.
2. A strict emission standard may reduce the abatement industry’s ability
to extract rents in its domestic market. This is the rent eﬀect, which
may pull in the direction of a weaker policy. However, the sign of the
rent eﬀect is ambiguous.
3. A strict emission standard may shift oligopoly profit away from the do-
mestic abatement industry. This is the rival R&D eﬀect, which may pull
in the direction of a weaker policy. However, the sign of the rival R&D
eﬀect is ambiguous.
In the simulations we find that both Point 2 and 3 above pull in the
direction of a less stringent policy, that is, both the rent eﬀect and the rival
R&D eﬀect are negative when policy is set at the textbook rule, i.e., with
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marginal abatement costs equal to the quota price. On the other hand, both
eﬀects are dominated by the price eﬀect, and in general we find that a stringent
policy is desirable.
We have not yet discussed the eﬀect on welfare of a R&D subsidy. The
first-order condition for the optimal R&D subsidy is given:
∂Wa
∂ζa
=

CS − ε(1− ra)
 ∂qa
∂wa
∂wa
∂ζa
+ (21)
%
∂wa
∂xha
∂xfb
∂ρb
xha +
∂wb
∂xhb
∂xhb
∂ρb
xfa
&
∂ρb
∂zb
∂zb
∂ζa
− ζa
∂za
∂ζa
= 0.
We assume that ∂
2Wa
∂(ζa)
2 < 0, and hence, that a maximum exists. The first
term is the price eﬀect again. Since a subsidy to R&D lowers the price on
carbon capture, the output of electricity and consumer surplus increases. As
shown above, for ra ≥ r0a, the price eﬀect [CS − ε(1− ra)] ∂qa∂wa
∂wa
∂ζa
must be
positive.
The next term is the strategic eﬀect, which is positive, since the term ∂zb∂ζa is
negative. That is, an R&D subsidy leads to lower levels of R&D spending
abroad, and this benefits the domestic firm through increased market share
both at home and abroad. This implies the following proposition:
Proposition 8 For the first best or a stringent environmental policy i.e. ra ≥
r0a, we have ζa > 0. That is, the government should provide an R&D subsidy.
Hence, the use of a stringent environmental policy does not rule out the
use of an environmental R&D subsidy and vice-versa. In the numerical simu-
lations the optimal R&D subsidy is small, and becomes higher/smaller if the
proportional standard is strengthened/weakened.
6 Numerical simulations
In order to shed light on the theoretical analyses, we will present the results of
some numerical simulations. Some of the theoretical conclusions are ambigu-
ous, and even when the sign of direction is unambiguous, it may be interesting
to look into the size of these eﬀects within a realistic framework. We will ap-
ply a numerical representation of the model described above, presented in
Greaker and Rosendahl[8].
6.1 Brief model description
The model describes the competition between one firm in a small Country A
and n symmetric firms in a large Region B. All firms supply carbon capture
equipment to both countries/regions, after doing R&D in a preceding stage.
In deciding upon the amount of R&D we assume that the n firms in Region
B form an R&D joint venture. That is, they decide cooperatively upon the
amount of R&D, and benefit equally from the results. 10
10This distinction between cooperation in the R&D stage and competition in the output
market has been analyzed theoretically by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin[1] and Kamien et
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The three functions that are not fully specified in the theoretical sections
above are the demand function qi(pi), the emission function ei(qi, xi) and the
R&D function ρ(zi). In the simulation model, a linear demand function is
chosen. Moreover, the following emission function is used, which satisfies the
properties assumed in Section 2:11
ei =
qi
1 + xiqi
. (22)
The R&D function is assumed to have the same shape as the well-known
learning curve, i.e., that the marginal costs of the technology fall by a fixed
percentage rate for every doubling of accumulated input zi. Although learn-
ing curves have mainly been used to estimate the relationship between unit
costs and accumulated use or investment of a technology (i.e., learning by do-
ing), Klaassen et al.[12] estimate successfully a two-factor learning curve for
wind power where R&D expenditures are included in addition to cumulative
capacity. Moreover, according to Gielen and Podkanski[7] learning by R&D
will be more important for the future costs of CCS than LBD, as opposed to
costs of renewables (see also OECD[15], p. 78). Thus, we specify the following
function:
ρ(zi) = ρi(zi + zi,0)
σi (23)
where z0 denotes historic accumulated R&D input, i.e., before the game
starts. The rest of the extended model is presented in a the companion paper
[8].
The numerical model is calibrated to fit two separate electricity markets,
and the supply of carbon capture technology as the only mean to reduce CO2
emissions. The electricity markets are similar in all respects but the size of
the market (the large region B being about 20 times larger than the small
country A). The main parameter values are shown in Table A1 in Appendix
D, and are described more fully in Greaker and Rosendahl[8].
Here we will briefly mention some of the most important parameter values.
The unit costs of the carbon capture technology amount to 35-40 per cent of
the electricity costs. In addition comes costs of transport and storage, which
amount to about 10 per cent of the electricity costs, but are fixed over time.
The learning rate for the R&D activity is assumed to be 13 per cent. The
international quota price on CO2 emissions in stage 3 is set to 10 Euro per
MWh (i.e., 25 Euro per ton CO2 for an average gas power plant), and the
number of firms in Region B is set to four. Note that the findings below
al.[11]. The latter paper concludes that a research joint venture yields the highest consumer
and producer surplus, as duplication of R&D activities is avoided and product prices are
not as high as with monopoly. Moreover, with external trade it is reasonable to assume
that the firms in Region B will benefit from cooperating in the R&D stage, but not in the
output market, as the latter would imply more aggressive behavior from foreign firms, see
for example Salant et al.[20].
11By solving for the emission function (22) we have xi(ri) =
ri
1−ri
.
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seem to be very robust to alternative specifications of parameters such as the
number of firms, technology costs and learning potential.
When it comes to policy in Region B, we assume that it is fixed and
unaﬀected by policy etc. in Country A. This is reasonable inasmuch as the
optimal policy in Region B is approximately insensitive to the policy of the
small country A. More specifically, we assume that the emission standard in
Region B is set equal to rB = 0.1. We also assume that there is no R&D
support in that region.
6.2 The eﬀects of tighter environmental standard
Before examining the optimal combination of policy in Country A, let us look
at the eﬀects of tightening the environmental standard in the small coun-
try. Figure 1 shows how diﬀerent levels of the standard aﬀect the domestic
price of the capture technology, export of this technology to the large re-
gion, and R&D eﬀorts in both countries/regions. The results are presented
as indexes (I), with I = 1 when the standard is set at its optimal level (see
below). The R&D subsidy is fixed in Figure 1, and set to its optimal level.
Figure 1. Eﬀects of diﬀerent emission standards in Country A on selected
variables. Index (I = 1 at ra = r∗a)
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From Proposition 3 above we know that the price of the technology falls
when the standard increases. In Figure 1 we see that this price eﬀect is very
significant. The price is approximately halved when the emission standard is
doubled.
R&D eﬀorts in both countries/regions are somewhat increased when the
standard is raised - domestic research increases slightly more in relative terms
than foreign research. In the theoretical analyses above we were not able to
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sign the eﬀect on R&D in general, but argued that it would be reasonable
to assume a positive association between emission standard and R&D eﬀorts,
particularly with low trade costs. The numerical simulations at least confirm
this assumption.
Finally, the technology export increases by only 0.1 per cent when the
standard is increased from 0.01 to 0.4, which reflects that the standard in
general has an ambiguous eﬀect on export (see Proposition 6).
6.3 The eﬀects of higher R&D subsidies
Let us now take a look at the eﬀects of higher subsidy rates on R&D in
Country A. Figure 2 shows the eﬀects of diﬀerent subsidy rates on the same
variables as in Figure 1. In Figure 2 the indexes are set to I = 1 when the
subsidy rate is set at its optimal level (see below). Now the standard is fixed
and set to its optimal level.
Figure 2. Eﬀects of diﬀerent R&D subsidy rates in Country A on selected
variables. Index (I = 1 at ζa = ζ
∗
a)
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According to Proposition 5 the domestic price of the technology falls when
the R&D subsidy is raised. This is also the case in Figure 2, but the price
decrease is really insignificant (0.1 per cent). This is striking compared to the
price decrease in Figure 1. Thus, the numerical simulations definitely show
that the emission standard is much more able to push down the technology
price and consequently the abatement costs.
On the other hand, the R&D subsidy naturally has a stronger impact on
the domestic R&D eﬀort, whereas R&D eﬀort in the large region falls. The
signs of both these eﬀects were found to hold in general (see Table I above).
The impact on foreign R&D is however almost zero, which is partly (but not
only) due the diﬀerences in size of Country A and Region B.
Proposition 6 stated that technology export would unambiguously rise
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when the R&D subsidy was raised. Figure 2 shows, however, that this eﬀect
also is very small (0.3 per cent).
To sum up so far, the numerical simulations clearly indicate that the
emission standard is the most powerful policy tool when it comes to bringing
domestic abatement costs down. Furthermore, none of these policy tools seem
to have any significant bearing on the export potential of the technology, at
least within our chosen modelling framework. These observations are useful
when we now turn our eyes on the optimal combination of policy in Country
A.
6.4 Optimal combination of policy in Country A
The simple textbook rule says that the optimal R&D subsidy (ζ∗a) is zero
as there are no spillover eﬀects, and that the optimal emission standard (r∗a)
should be set so that marginal abatement cost equals the international quota
price (i.e., r∗a = r
0
a). However, as we have seen in the theoretical part of the
paper, the imperfect market situation will generally lead to other conclusions.
We showed theoretically that the R&D subsidy should be positive, whereas
the emission standard could be either higher or lower than r0a (i.e., r
∗
a ≶ r0a).
On the other hand, we noted above that the emission standard seemed to
have very significant eﬀects on the domestic market, whereas the R&D subsidy
seemed to have only minor eﬀects on both technology price and export.
Figure 3. Welfare in Country A with diﬀerent combinations of emission
standard and R&D subsidy
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Figure 3 shows how the welfare of Country A (displayed as indiﬀerence
curves) is aﬀected by various combinations of these two policy instruments.
The optimal combination is an emission standard of r∗a = 0.19 and an R&D
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subsidy of ζ∗a = 0.04. At this standard the direct marginal abatement costs
are about 2 times higher than the international quota price. This reflects that
the price eﬀect discussed in Proposition 7 clearly dominates the rent eﬀect
and the rival R&D eﬀect. When looking at Figure 1, this comes at no surprise.
In fact, for any positive ra the direct marginal abatement costs exceed
the international quota price, so that r0a = 0. The marginal abatement costs
are actually falling in ra up to about ra = 0.25. The reason is that the drop
in technology price from higher standard dominates the increased marginal
costs for a given price.
As demonstrated theoretically above, the R&D subsidy should be positive
even in the absence of spillover eﬀects. First, it contributes to lower market
price of the technology due to lower costs and thus more aggressive behavior
of the domestic firm. Second, the R&D subsidy has a positive strategic eﬀect.
Nevertheless, the size of the optimal R&D subsidy is quite small, which reflects
that the positive eﬀects of the subsidy are very small after all (cf. Figure 2
discussed above). Thus, with no spillover eﬀects massive support of domestic
research is not recommended.
If we look closer at Figure 3, we note that the optimal choice of emission
standard is completely independent of the choice of R&D subsidy. Although
a higher subsidy rate stimulates domestic R&D (cf. Figure 2), the technology
price is only marginally decreased, and so are the costs of abatement. On
the other hand, the optimal R&D subsidy is quite dependent on the choice
of emission standard. This complementarity follows from the fact that when
a strong standard is imposed, more abatement technology is needed, and
the benefits of more R&D increase. The figure also shows quite clearly that
choosing the right emission standard is much more important than picking
the optimal R&D subsidy.
7 Discussion
How robust are the conclusions drawn above? One way of testing this is to
run a number of simulations, with diﬀerent combinations of the uncertain
parameters. By running several hundred simulations, varying the most im-
portant parameters in the model, we find that the observations in Figure 1
and 2 are indeed very robust. The price eﬀect of changing the standard is
very significant, the technology export is insensitive to the standard and also
reacts little to the subsidy, whereas both policy tools stimulate R&D eﬀorts
(subsidies clearly most). As the results are not very dependent on the para-
meter values, we dare say that the qualitative results may be generalized to
other small countries facing similar environmental and technology challenges,
and market conditions.
The optimal combination of policy is of course more sensitive to the pa-
rameter choices. Nevertheless, the optimal subsidy rate is generally small
(below 0.1). More interestingly, at the optimal standard the direct marginal
abatement costs generally exceed the international quota price.12
12There is one exception to this conclusion. Due to our choice of linear demand function,
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A more critical objection against our analyses is our choice of modelling,
and in particular our choice of policy instrument, i.e., the emission standard.
As mentioned in Section 2, our implementation of a standard is very similar
to green certificate markets, as implemented or proposed for the electricity
market in several countries (e.g., Norway and Sweden) and discussed in others
(e.g., the EU). A proportional standard could also be implemented within a
quota market, if firms receive free allowances for a certain level of emissions per
produced output. This is actually the case for new entrants in the Emission
Trading Scheme in the EU (and Norway), and could possibly become extended
to incumbents from 2013. Today, however, there is very little credit for carbon
capture and storage in the EU ETS, as the power plant risk not receiving
any free emission allowances, and there is no credit at all in current green
certificate markets. Thus, it is not obvious how CCS will be rewarded in
future environmental policies.
Nevertheless, it is important to draw attention to some particularities with
the eﬀects of the emission standard. One is the impact on producer surplus.
As the emission standard implies that some purchase of the technology is
always necessary, no matter what the price is, the price of the technology
(i.e., the mark up) is very sensitive to the size of the standard. This actually
implies that the producer surplus generally falls, though not much, when the
standard increases. The price eﬀect is more important than the output eﬀect.
To test how sensitive the conclusions are to the choice of environmental
policy, we have also done analyses with an emission ceiling (e.g., implemented
by a domestic quota market) instead of an emission standard. In order to
obtain explicit first order conditions, we had to change our emission function
to a simpler one (i.e., ei = qi/xi). In this case all the theoretical findings carry
over completely. Moreover, the findings in Figure 1 and 2 are completely re-
produced. In particular, the price of the technology falls significantly when
the emission quota is reduced, whereas the export level is approximately un-
changed. The eﬀects of higher R&D subsidies are almost identical to the
results in Figure 2.
8 Conclusion
Implementing an especially stringent climate policy may be well founded,
even for a small country. That is, a small country may benefit from setting
emission reduction targets implying that marginal abatement costs exceed the
international quota price. Such a policy will increase domestic competition
between carbon abatement suppliers, and lead to lower carbon abatement
costs.
the marginal abatement costs have an upper limit. Thus, if the international quota price
exceeds this limit, any level of ra means that marginal abatement costs are below the quota
price. Still, the optimal level of ra will typically be very high, but not equal to one. In
this case the price eﬀect will be negative, as the emission price eﬀect will dominate the
consumer surplus eﬀect of increased output. As we believe the linear demand assumption
to be reasonable only at normal levels of production, our focus lies on the results with
moderate levels of standard.
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On the other hand, an especially stringent environmental policy is not a
particularly good industrial policy as long as the purpose is to develop new
successful export sectors. Although a stronger environmental policy will lead
to more domestic environmental research, also foreign firms will increase their
R&D spending and their sales of abatement technology to the small country.
In order to deal with the Kyoto Protocol, both the EU and Norway have
recently initiated an emission trading scheme (ETS), covering the power sec-
tor and some major industry sectors. However, as emission allowances are
allocated freely to the emitting firms, the ETS gives little incentives to in-
stall carbon capture technologies (or invest in renewable energy), as valuable
allowances then would be lost. This could be altered if the allocation of al-
lowances were based on energy production, and not emissions, including CCS
and other CO2-free energy production.
In light of this lack of technology incentives, subsidy programs to carbon
abatement technologies could be seen as a compensation, leading the way
towards future abatement of carbon emissions. Somewhat to our surprise,
the results in this paper do not support this activist policy, but rather the
contrary. The explanation is that supporting research on clean technologies
makes little sense if it is not backed up by clear incentives in the market to
implement the clean technology.
So far, we must therefore conclude that the case for extensive subsidizing
of carbon abatement firms is clearly rather weak. Remember that an R&D
subsidy has two favorable eﬀects within our model concept: 1) it lowers the
domestic abatement price, and 2) it shifts profit from the foreign firms to the
domestic firm. With respect to the latter eﬀect, we find that the strategic
eﬀect of a subsidy is small. This is the case even though we model the car-
bon abatement market with Cournot competition and without free entry of
new firms, leading to large profits in the domestic carbon abatement firm.
Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated carbon abatement technologies, or
free entry of new firms, would presumably yield an even smaller strategic mo-
tive for an R&D subsidy. With respect to the first eﬀect, our results suggest
that a stringent standard is far more eﬀective in lowering the domestic carbon
abatement cost.
Clearly, a possible third favorable eﬀect of an R&D subsidy could arise
if there were domestic spillover eﬀects within the small country (see e.g.
Lund[13]). In our analyses we have not considered this possibility, as we
have assumed only one domestic firm in Country A. Future research should
look more into this question, as well as examining the eﬀects of alternative
policy instruments such as deployment subsidies and emission taxes or quotas.
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the main focus should be on imple-
menting a suﬃciently stringent climate policy, and, in particular, not replace
it with an extensive subsidy programs.
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A The supply of carbon capture technology
As mentioned, we assume dxidri > 0. The suﬃcient conditions are:
2pa +
xha + x
f
b
xa(ra)
pa < 0, (24)
pa − c0 +
xha + x
f
b
xa(ra)
pa ≤ 0, (25)
where the latter conditions holds as long as

xfb
xa(ra)
pa
 ≥ va + ρa.
The two markets for carbon capture technology have identical structures,
and are both independent of the climate policy in the other jurisdiction.
Hence, it should be enough to look at one of the markets when determining
the eﬀect of climate policy on supply of carbon capture technology. Inserting
according to: wi(xi, ri) = 1xi(ri)pi

xi
xi(ri)

− c0xi(ri) − vi, we have for the two
first-order conditions (Country A):
∂πa
∂xha
= x
h
a
[xa(ra)]
2p

a +
1
xa(ra)
pa − c0xa(ra) − va − ρa = 0
∂πb
∂xfb
=
xfb
[xa(ra)]
2p

a +
1
xa(ra)
pa − c0xa(ra) − va − ρb − t = 0
(26)
The second-order conditions are 1
[xa(ra)]
2
k
2pa +
xha
xa(ra)
pa
l
and 1
[xa(ra)]
2

2pa +
xfb
xa(ra)
pa

.
We have assumed ∂
2πa
∂(xha)
2 ,
∂2πb
∂(xfb )
2
< 0, which is ensured by (24).
The cross derivatives ∂
2πa
∂xfb ∂x
h
a
and ∂
2πb
∂xha∂x
f
b
are 1
[xa(ra)]
2
k
pa +
xha
xa(ra)
pa
l
and
1
[xa(ra)]
2

pa +
xfb
xa(ra)
pa

, respectively. In order to ensure that the strategic
variables are substitutes we assume that they are negative as well.
Denote the derivatives above for short πaa,πbb,πab and πba, respectively,
and assume πaaπbb − πabπba > 0 (in order to ensure a unique equilibrium).
For the derivatives πara =
∂2πa
∂ra∂xha
and πbra =
∂2πb
∂ra∂x
f
b
we have:
πara =
−xa
[xa(ra)]
2

xha
xa(ra)
(2pa + qap

a) + pa − c0 + qapa

> 0, (27)
where the term outside the brackets is negative. The terms inside the brackets
must be negative as well by (24) and (25). This also holds for πbra :
πbra =
−xa
[xa(ra)]
2
%
xfb
xa(ra)
(2pa + qap

a) + pa − c0 + qapa
&
> 0. (28)
Note that the two expressions in (27) and (28) are identical apart from xha
and xfb . Hence, as long as x
f
b < x
h
a, we have πara > πbra .
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By totally diﬀerentiating the two equations in (26) we get:
dxha
dra
=
πabπbra − πbbπara
πaaπbb − πabπba
,
dxfb
dra
=
πbaπara − πaaπbra
πaaπbb − πabπba
,
We then have the following two alternatives:
I) πbaπara − πaaπbra < 0→
dxha
dra
> 0
dxfb
dra
< 0
II) πbaπara − πaaπbra > 0→
dxha
dra
> 0
dxfb
dra
> 0
Assume pa = 0 and pa− c0+
xha+x
f
b
xa(ra)
pa = 0. We then have alternative I) if:
xha − 2x
f
b > 0
In case ρa 1 ρb + t, we must have xha ) xfb and alternative II above.
Hence, alternative II) above is the most likely case. In case ρa << ρb + t, we
have xha >> x
f
b , and alternative I above may be the case.
Since πara > πbra , it also follows that
dxha
dra
≥ dx
f
b
dra
.
B The R&D game
B.1 The eﬀect of policy on abatement with R&D
The two first-order conditions from the R&D game can be written:
∂ωi
∂zi
=
%
∂wi
∂xf−i
∂xf−i
∂ρi
xhi +
∂w−i
∂xh−i
∂xh−i
∂ρi
xfi
&
∂ρi
∂zi
−
k
xhi + x
f
i
l ∂ρi
∂zi
− (1− ζi) = 0.
In order to ensure an internal maximum we assume ωii < 0 for i = a, b.
Further, we assume that the levels of R&D are strategic substitutes i.e.
ω−ii < 0 for i = a, b. Finally, we assume that the uniqueness condition
holds: ωiiω−i−i − ω−iiωi−i > 0 for i = a, b.
Let φi denote the exogenous variables ri, ζi and t. Further, denote
∂2ωi
∂φi∂zi
=
ωiφ. Then, by total diﬀerentiation we have:
dza
dφi
=
ωabωbφ − ωbbωaφ
ωaaωbb − ωabωba
,
dzb
dφi
=
ωbaωaφ − ωaaωbφ
ωaaωbb − ωabωba
.
Since ωaaωbb − ωabωba > 0, we have: sign
k
dza
dφi
l
= sign [ωabωbφ − ωbbωaφ]
and sign
k
dzb
dφi
l
= sign [ωbaωaφ − ωaaωbφ].
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For the derivatives ωaζa and ωbζa we have:
ωaζa = 1 and ωbζa = 0, (29)
We then get for the levels of R&D:
sign

dza
dζa

= sign [−ωbb] and sign

dzb
dζa

= sign [ωab] .
Both signs are unambiguous, and given directly from the assumption
about the signs on the derivatives. For the two other cross-derivatives we
have:
ωara =
%
∂2ωa
∂ra∂x
f
b
∂xfb
∂ρa
xha +
∂ωa
∂xfb
∂2xfb
∂ra∂ρa
xha +
∂ωa
∂xfb
∂xfb
∂ρa
∂xha
∂ra
− ∂x
h
a
∂ra
&
ρ(za) > 0,
(30)
ωbra =
%
∂2ωa
∂ra∂xha
∂xha
∂ρb
xfb +
∂ωa
∂xha
∂2xha
∂ra∂ρb
xfb +
∂ωa
∂xha
∂xha
∂ρb
∂xfb
∂ra
− ∂x
f
b
∂ra
&
ρ(zb) W 0,
(31)
where we assume based on Lemma 1 that ∂
2ωa
∂ra∂x
f
b
, ∂
2ωa
∂ra∂xha
< 0, and based on
the upstream market becoming larger that ∂
2xfb
∂ra∂ρa
, ∂
2xha
∂ra∂ρb
> 0. Further, if
∂xfb
∂ra
> 0, we also have ωbra > 0.
For za = zb and t > 0, we have dzadra > 0, since in a symmetric equilibrium
|ωab| < |ωbb| and ∂x
f
b
∂ra
< ∂x
h
a
∂ra
. It seems reasonable to assume that dzadra > 0 also
when za 9= zb. This is also confirmed by our numerical simulations.
The derivative dzbdra cannot be signed. If
∂xfb
∂ra
< 0, and the two last terms
in (31) dominate the two first terms such that ωbra < 0, we have
dzb
dra
< 0. On
the other hand, for za = zb and t = 0, we must have
dzb
dra
> 0, since for t = 0;
∂xfb
∂ra
= ∂x
h
a
∂ra
.
C The eﬀect of policy on the abatement price
We assume in line with general Cournot theory that ∂wi∂ρi ,
∂wi
∂ρ−i
> 0, i.e. that
the Nash-equilibrium price increases if one of the two firms experiences an
increase in marginal production costs.
We then have:
dwi
dri
=
∂wi
∂ri
+
∂wi
∂ρi
∂ρi
∂zi
∂zi
∂ri
+
∂wi
∂ρ−i
∂ρ−i
∂z−i
∂z−i
∂ri
< 0,
since ∂wi∂ri < 0 and
∂wi
∂ρi
> 0, ∂ρi∂zi
∂zi
∂ri
< 0 and
∂ρi∂zi
∂zi
∂ri
 ≥
∂ρ−i∂z−i
∂z−i
∂ri
.
The eﬀect of the R&D subsidy on the price of carbon capture is given:
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∂wi
∂ζi
=
∂wi
∂ρi
∂ρi
∂zi
∂zi
∂ζi
+
∂wi
∂ρ−i
∂ρ−i
∂z−i
∂z−i
∂ζi
< 0,
since ∂ρi∂zi
∂zi
∂ζi
< 0 and
∂ρi∂zi
∂zi
∂ζi
 ≥
∂ρ−i∂z−i
∂z−i
∂ζi
 .
D Parameter values in numerical model
Table A1. Main parameter values in the numerical model
Parameter Country A Region B
Unit cost electricity ci 25 Euro/MWh 25 Euro/MWh
Choke price electricity Si 62 Euro/MWh 62 Euro/MWh
Slope in demand function si 0.01 0.0005
R&D learning exponent σi -0.2 -0.2
R&D parameter ρi 19 19
Initial (accumulated) R&D eﬀort zi,0 32 M Euro 32 M Euro
Unit storage cost vi 2.4 Euro/MWh 2.4 Euro/MWh
Unit trade cost for abatement tech. t 2 Euro
Number of firms ni 1 4
International quota price  10 Euro/MWh
Discount rate 7%
Length of stage 2 (R&D stage) 7τ 10 years
Length of stage 3 (Cournot stage) 20 years
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